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Abstract 
 
We investigate whether collateral helps to solve adverse selection problems. Theory 
predicts a negative relationship between presence of collateral and risk premium, as 
collateral constitutes a signalling instrument for the borrower to be charged with a lower 
risk premium. However, bankers’ view and most empirical evidence contradict this 
prediction in accordance with the observed-risk hypothesis. We provide new evidence 
with loan-level data and country-level data for a sample of 5843 bank loans from 43 
countries. We test whether the degree information asymmetries affects the link between 
the presence of collateral and risk premium. We include five proxies for the degree of 
information asymmetries, measuring opacity of financial information, trust, and 
development. We find that a greater degree of information asymmetries reduces the 
positive relationship between the presence of collateral and the risk premium. This 
finding provides support for the adverse selection and observed-risk hypotheses, as both 
hypotheses may be empirically validated depending of the degree of information 
asymmetries in the country. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: G20, O5 
Keywords: Collateral, Bank, Asymmetric information, Institutions. 
 
 
 
 3
1. Introduction 
There is widespread evidence regarding the massive use of collateral by banks for 
firm loans. Berger and Udell (1995) observe that 53% of firm loans are secured in the 
USA, whereas Davydenko and Franks (2005) observe that 75.7% of firm loans are 
secured in France and 88.5% in Germany. 
It is therefore of utmost interest to know why banks use collateral. A first intuitive 
reason is that collateral provides a reduction in the risk of loan loss for the bank in the 
event of default. It can also be argued however that collateral helps solve problems 
resulting from information asymmetries, and notably the problem of moral hazard after 
the loan is granted. By giving collateral, the interests of the borrower are forcibly aligned 
with those of the bank. Furthermore, collateral, which in turn helps minimize adverse 
selection, constitutes a signalling instrument by providing the bank with valuable 
information at the time of lending. Indeed, collateral helps the bank obtain private 
information owned by the borrower, as high-quality borrowers are more likely to provide 
collateral in compensation for a low loan rate than low-quality borrowers. 
Extensive publications provide theoretical support for this latter argument (Bester, 
1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987), which is quite easily 
testable. Indeed, the signalling role of collateral and its ability to mitigate adverse 
selection problems should lead to lower rates for secured loans. 
However, two surprising observations emerge from the empirical literature. The 
first one is the small number of studies on this topic, which are all single-country studies, 
and all investigate this issue in developed countries (Berger and Udell, 1990, 1995, 
Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000, Jimenez and Saurina, 2004). 
The second and most striking observation is the consensual lack of empirical 
support for the adverse selection hypothesis in the use of collateral. Indeed most papers 
conclude to a positive relationship between collateral and risk premium, with such 
finding in accordance with the commonly accepted view among bankers that riskier loans 
would be associated with more collateral, as mentioned by Berger and Udell (1990) and 
Jimenez and Saurina (2004). The rationale is that banks would be able to sort the 
borrowers from information they have on their quality. As a result, they would charge 
 4
riskier borrowers with higher loan rates and require higher collateral from these 
borrowers. This argument is commonly called the observed-risk hypothesis. 
The aim of this paper is therefore to provide a broad and ambitious investigation of 
the role of collateral to mitigate adverse selection problems. Our starting point is the 
consideration that the conflicting debate between the adverse selection hypothesis and the 
observed-risk hypothesis is flawed. Indeed, both hypotheses may be empirically validated 
depending of the degree of information asymmetries. Namely, they differ regarding the 
importance of the information asymmetries between the borrower and the bank. In 
presence of strong information asymmetries, the incentives for the borrower would be 
stronger to signal his quality to the bank, while in case of low information asymmetries 
the bank is more likely to know the quality of the borrower and therefore to charge the 
borrower with a greater loan rate and a higher probability to require collateral from him. 
Therefore, both hypotheses may be validated depending on the degree of information 
asymmetries in a country. 
To this end, we perform a cross-country investigation of the relationship between 
collateral and risk premium to allow the consideration of different national frameworks. 
We do so by using the dataset Dealscan which provides detailed information on loan 
characteristics for a large set of countries. It enables a major contribution to the role of 
collateral to mitigate adverse selection problems by investigating the possible impact of 
country-specific variables influencing information asymmetries on this role. We use five 
proxies to capture the degree of information asymmetries between the borrower and the 
bank before the loan is granted. They control for opacity of financial information, trust, 
economic and financial development. 
Namely, the adverse selection hypothesis would be rejected whether a positive link 
between collateral and risk premium is observed. However it also receives some support 
in parallel with the observed-risk hypothesis if we conclude that factors reducing 
information asymmetries contribute to strengthen the positive link between collateral and 
risk premium. Such finding would indeed mean that the relationship between collateral 
and risk premium is dependent of the degree of information asymmetries between the 
borrower and the bank, in accordance with both hypotheses. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the framework of 
the role of collateral to solve adverse selection problems. We first develop the 
background on this role, before describing the country-level variables adopted to control 
for this relationship in our investigation. Section III describes the data and loan-level 
variables. In section IV, we report the results. We finally provide some concluding 
remarks in section V, and the Appendix contains explanations of all variables we use in 
the paper. 
 
II. Collateral and adverse selection: a conceptual framework 
II.1 Theoretical and empirical background 
This section presents the literature on the adverse selection argument for the use of 
collateral. Before presenting the empirical tests, it is necessary to develop the theory 
underlying the argument. 
Collateral may solve the problem of adverse selection thanks to the better 
information owned by the borrower in comparison to the bank before the lending 
decision. This private information may lead to credit rationing because of the inability of 
the bank to price the loan according to the borrower’s quality (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Therefore, high-quality borrowers have incentives to show their quality, using a credible 
signal, one that can not be provided by low-quality borrowers. Collateral is such a signal, 
as it is more costly for low-quality borrowers since they have a higher chance of 
defaulting and hence of losing the collateral (Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; 
Besanko and Thakor, 1987). Consequently, as collateral acts as a signalling device, it 
conveys valuable information about the borrower to the bank, which can then screen 
borrowers by offering the choice between a secured loan with a low interest rate and an 
unsecured loan with a high interest rate. A high-quality borrower will be inclined to 
choose the secured loan since his low risk of default diminishes the probability of losing 
collateral and increases the probability of repaying interest. 
This argument supports a negative link between collateral and credit risk, as a 
secured loan would be associated with a higher quality of borrowers. However, the fact 
that collateral is associated with greater credit risk has gone mainstream among bankers 
as mentioned by Berger and Udell (1990) and Jimenez and Saurina (2004). The rationale 
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underlying the observed-risk hypothesis is that, with information on the quality of 
potential borrowers, banks are able to charge riskier borrowers with higher rates, 
simultaneously requiring more collateral from these borrowers to reduce loan loss in the 
event of default. Since collateral reduces potential loss, the bank would be more inclined 
ceteris paribus to demand collateral from high-risk clients. 
The coexistence of this hypothesis and the adverse selection argument makes the 
link between collateral and risk premium of utmost interest. Therefore, we tackle the 
question of knowing whether the selection adverse argument is empirically validated for 
the use of collateral. 
Empirical literature remains however relatively scarce on this issue. Berger and 
Udell (1990) investigate the relationship between collateral and credit risk on a sample of 
one million loans from US banks. They test the hypothesis that adverse selection matters 
for the use of collateral by regressing the risk premium on a set of loan characteristics 
including a dummy variable considering whether the loan is secured or not. The 
conclusion does not corroborate the adverse selection argument, as a positive and 
significant relationship is observed between collateral and risk premium. This finding 
may be explained by the fact that banks require more collateral from riskier borrowers 
who are also charged with higher loan rates, in accordance with the observed-risk 
hypothesis. 
However, in a work focusing on the associations between collateral, banking 
relationship and risk premium, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find a negative link 
between the presence of collateral and interest rate for a sample of 18 000 Belgian loans. 
It is important to note, however, that this result, in accordance with the adverse selection 
hypothesis, may be influenced by the specificities of the dataset. This study is the only 
one on this topic, using loans from only one bank, as all loans come from a major Belgian 
bank. Therefore the behavior of the bank in loan collateralization affects the results and 
limits their generalization. 
Jimenez and Saurina (2004) focus on the determinants of the probability of default 
of bank loans analyzing 3 million loans provided by Spanish banks. Probability of default 
is considered as an ex post credit risk measure. As a consequence, they do not only test 
whether collateral mitigates adverse selection problems, but also whether collateral 
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solves moral hazard problems. The probability of default is explained by a set of loan 
characteristics including information on collateral. Depending on the collateralized share 
of the loan, the model takes into account three dummy variables. The authors find a 
greater probability of default for secured loans, which is in accordance with the view of a 
positive link between the presence of collateral and credit risk. 
Finally, the most recent study from Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006) takes a 
broader perspective by analyzing a wide range of determinants of the presence of 
collateral. This study does not however analyze the link between the presence of 
collateral and risk premium. Tested determinants include the characteristics of the 
borrower with credit quality, but also the characteristics of the bank, the competition on 
the loan market and the macroeconomic conditions. Credit quality, related to the theories 
on a bank’s use of collateral, is proxied by a dummy variable which takes into account 
the fact that the borrower had recently a loan in default. The authors then observe that the 
credit quality of the borrower positively affects the presence of collateral, which is in 
accordance with the observed-risk hypothesis. 
This presentation of the literature devoted to the adverse selection argument for the 
use of collateral leads to two main conclusions. First, empirical evidence tends to support 
the observed-risk hypothesis, according to which riskier borrowers are more often 
required to provide collateral. This hypothesis is commonly accepted by bankers. At first 
glance, this element tends to invalidate the theoretical argument of the use of collateral to 
resolve adverse selection problems. Second, the few studies that exist remain limited to 
few developed countries. Therefore, no study testing this role of collateral has ever been 
performed in developing countries. Consequently, their results may be influenced by 
hidden variables such as institutions and development. Our empirical work aims to 
address these deficiencies. 
 
II.2 Country-level explanatory variables 
Our work investigates the role that collateral plays in mitigating adverse selection. 
To this end, we test the relationship between collateral and risk premium with a set of 43 
countries. Next to the general relationship observed between these both variables, one 
may wonder whether some country-specific variables exert an impact on this link. 
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Indeed, the theoretical argument supporting the role of collateral to mitigate ex ante 
information asymmetries is based on its signalling role. The opposite hypothesis, the 
observed-risk hypothesis, considers that, before the loan is granted, information 
asymmetries are overestimated and that banks can sort the borrowers from information 
they have on their credit quality. 
As a consequence, we can consider that country-specific factors exert an impact on 
information asymmetries, affecting the relationship between collateral and risk premium. 
Namely, all factors increasing ex ante information asymmetries should favor the adverse 
selection hypothesis and therefore support a negative relationship. Meanwhile, all 
elements reducing ex ante information asymmetries should strengthen the observed-risk 
hypothesis and consequently support a positive relationship. Three categories of variables 
can notably affect the magnitude of ex ante information asymmetries between the 
borrower and the bank. 
First, the opacity of a borrower’s financial information before the loan is granted 
exerts an obvious impact on the information asymmetries. Greater quality and availability 
of financial information for the bank reduces information asymmetries. In our study, we 
adopt an indicator for the quality of financial information, Accounting Standards. 
Following La Porta et al. (1998) and Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004), this variable 
proxies quality of financial information about firms. It measures the number of items 
listed on firms’ financial statements, an indicator ranging from zero to 90 and compiled 
by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). 
A second variable is the presence of information sharing mechanisms. Indeed, 
following Japelli and Pagano (2002), two types of information sharing institutions can be 
implemented in a country: private bureaus and public registries. Private bureaus are based 
on principles of voluntary membership and mutuality of data flows. They are commercial 
organizations in most cases. Public registries are generally founded by the central bank or 
a banking supervisory authority and gather information for credits over a certain 
threshold. Information from public registries may be free of charge for banks. Japelli and 
Pagano (1993) have shown that information sharing institutions reduce information 
asymmetries in the relationship between the borrower and the bank by allowing a 
reduction of the loan rates and of the probability of repayment failure. 
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It is taken into account through a dummy variable equal to unity if an information 
sharing institution operates in the country (Information Sharing). This variable is also 
replaced by its two components in some estimations: Public Registry and Private Bureau, 
which are dummy variables respectively equal to one if a public registry or a private 
bureau operates in the country, and otherwise zero. This process investigates which 
information sharing institution contributes the most to the link between collateral and risk 
premium. 
Second, the behavior of the borrower and the resulting expectations of the bank 
may affect information asymmetries. A borrower’s honesty contributes to reduce 
information asymmetries by decreasing hidden information. Additionally, a bank’s trust 
of its borrower reduces the efforts of banks to mitigate problems resulting from 
information asymmetries. 
Following Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001) and La Porta et al. 
(1997b), we adopt a measure of trust from World Values Survey (Trust). It is defined as 
the weighted average normalized to scale 0 to 100 of survey responses to the question: 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people?”, where a response of 1 indicates that most people can 
be trusted and 0 indicates that you can’t be too careful. A greater value of this measure is 
therefore expected to be associated with lower information asymmetries. Consequently, a 
greater degree of trust should enhance the link between collateral and risk premium. 
Third, bank behavior can exert an impact on information asymmetries. Better skills 
of bank employees in risk analysis of loans are likely to reduce the information 
asymmetries before the loan granting. We can then consider that such skills are favored 
by financial and economic development, owing to better knowledge and learning of bank 
employees. Economic Development is defined as the logarithm of GDP per capita 
averaged between 1994 and 2003, with data coming from Penn World Tables 6.2. Several 
measures of financial development can be applied as done by Levine, Loayza and Beck 
(2000). However, as our focus is on the skills of bank employees in risk analysis of loans, 
the adopted measure of financial development for our study needs to proxy the 
importance of bank credit in a country. Therefore, we define Financial Development as 
the ratio of the volume of credit to private enterprises to GDP averaged over the 1995 to 
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1997 period. That ratio measures the extent to which credit is allocated to private firms, 
as opposed to government or state-owned firms. It is widely used in the empirical 
literature to proxy for the development of financial intermediaries (e.g. Beck and Levine, 
2004). We expect a positive impact of these variables on the relationship between 
presence of collateral and risk premium, as they are both associated with lower 
information asymmetries. 
We also include some control variables in our analysis. These variables are chosen 
according to their expected explanatory power of the risk premium, the explained 
variable in the regressions. Following a large body of research on law and finance 
pioneered by La Porta et al. (1997a), we adopt two variables for the impact of legal 
environment. Protection of creditor rights is measured with the index developed by La 
Porta et al. (1998) (Creditor Rights). This index is scored on a scale from zero to four 
with a higher score indicating better protection. It considers four aspects of the protection 
of creditor rights. Law enforcement is measured with the ‘Rule of Law’ index provided 
by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a, b) (Rule of Law). This indicator 
assesses the respect of a country’s citizens for their country’s legal framework. It refers to 
“the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society,” taking 
into consideration that a chief component of this cluster is the enforceability of contracts. 
We prefer to use this indicator rather than La Porta et al. (1998)’s “Rule of Law” index, 
owing to its availability. 
A third control variable takes bank costs into account. Indeed risk premium is 
expected to cover operating costs of banks. Therefore, bank costs should be positively 
associated with risk premium. Bank Costs is defined as the ratio of overhead costs to total 
banking assets for 1999, following Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004). This information is 
derived from the same article. 
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III. Data and variables 
The sample of bank loans is obtained from the Dealscan database, which is 
supplied by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters), which provides detailed 
information on loans to large companies. As the focus of our research is the investigation 
of country-level factors on the use of collateral to solve adverse selection problems, we 
only keep loans from countries for which we have country-level information for most of 
the required factors. We use loan data for the period January 1991 to August 2006. 
Indeed the dataset goes back to the late 1980s but the coverage of bank loans is poor 
during this decade. 
Following Qian and Strahan (2007), we drop loans to firms from the financial 
industry (SIC 6) and from the public sector (SIC 9). Public ownership or the monopoly 
situation is likely to influence the risk of loans granted to these firms, which may bias the 
use of collateral in comparison to what would be observed in manufacturing and other 
services. These criteria produced a sample of 5,843 bank loans made to borrowers located 
in 43 countries (excluding the US). 
The focus of our research is the investigation of the relationship between risk 
premium and the presence of collateral. To this end, we proceed to regressions of risk 
premium on a set of variables including the presence of collateral and some loan-level 
control variables. Risk premium is the difference between the loan rate and the prime rate 
used by the bank for the loan pricing. Information on risk premium is directly provided in 
the database.  
We estimate the following equation using OLS regression: 
 
Risk Premium (Intercept,Collateral,Collateral Key Variable, , )f X ε = ×  (1) 
 
The explanatory variable of primary concern is the presence of collateral, which, in 
accordance with most works on the use of collateral, is measured by a dummy variable 
(Collateral) equal to one if the loan is secured and to zero if it is not. We also investigate 
how the degree of information asymmetries influences the relationship between risk 
premium and the presence of collateral. To account for these variables, we add 
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Collateral×Key Variable, which is an interaction term between each country-level 
variable measuring this degree and the presence of collateral in the regressions. 
X is a vector of control variables. These include information on loan maturity 
(Maturity), on the type of loan, which is controlled through a dummy variable equal to 
one if the loan is a term loan and otherwise to zero1 (Type). As many loans are 
syndicated, we control for the number of lenders involved in the loan by measuring the 
logarithm of the number of lenders, following notably Qian and Strahan (2007) (Number 
of Lenders). We also take into account information on loan size (LoanAmount), which is 
defined as the amount of the tranche of the loan in thousand dollars. Indeed syndicated 
loans are granted by tranches, which can be charged with different loan rates. Finally, the 
presence of covenants in the loan contracts is controlled through a dummy variable equal 
to one if the loan contract includes covenants and otherwise to zero (Covenants). Dummy 
variables for each industry (for each 1-digit SIC code) and each year are also included in 
the estimations to control for industry effects and year effects. ε  is the residual which is 
supposed to be normally distributed. 
Table 1 reports mean values for the loan-level variables by country. Risk premium 
varies considerably, from 71.67 basic points in Ghana to 320 in South Africa, with a 
mean value of 166.06 basic points for the full sample. These differences partly reflect the 
differences in economic development which contribute to reduce the risk premium, even 
if significant exceptions exist. The proportion of secured loans strongly varies across 
countries from 10.99% in Japan to 100% in five countries (Ghana, Guatemala, Morocco, 
Peru, and Uruguay). On the full sample, 55.72% of loans are secured. 
Regarding the maturity of loans, the cross-country discrepancies are rather limited 
with mean maturities ranging from 12 months in Morocco to 137 months in Portugal. As 
many loans are syndicated, the number of lenders ranges from 1 in Uruguay to 20 in 
Ghana, with a mean of 7.98 lenders for the full sample. 
The share of term loans, which is provided by the value of Loan Type, varies from 
0% in Morocco to 100% in Ghana and Guatemala. As the 1st and the 9th deciles are 
respectively 31% and 82%, we can however conclude that a significant proportion of 
most countries’ loans are term loans and other loans. Here again, the extreme values are 
                                                          
1 A term loan is defined in Dealscan as an instalment loan where amounts repaid may not be reborrowed. 
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linked, at least in part, to the small size of national samples. The mean size of loans varies 
considerably across countries, even if all loans have a substantial amount in accordance 
with the coverage of Dealscan. The range goes from 9,065.6 thousand dollars in Uruguay 
to 547,022.2 thousand dollars in Denmark. 
 
IV. Results 
This section displays the results of our study on the role of collateral to solve 
adverse selection problems. In our regression models, we begin by testing the link 
between risk premium and the presence of collateral in cross-country estimations. These 
estimations provide some benchmark regressions for the rest of the study. We then 
investigate how the degree of information asymmetries influences the relationship 
between risk premium and the presence of collateral. To this end, we add an interaction 
term between each country-level variable measuring this degree and the presence of 
collateral in the regressions. 
Next we perform two kinds of robustness check tests. First, we test whether our 
findings are sensitive to the inclusion of other country-level variables, and second, we 
investigate the issue of the endogeneity of collateral in our estimations. 
 
IV.1 The benchmark estimations 
We first present the results of the regression of risk premium for the different sets 
of variables. These estimations are benchmarks for the ones including the interaction 
terms, as they provide valuable information on the coefficient of Collateral and on the 
coefficients of the control variables, which are likely to be affected by the inclusion of the 
interaction terms. The results are displayed in table 2. 
We perform five estimations by testing different combinations of country-level 
variables. The first estimation does not include any country-level variable (column 1). 
The second estimation includes dummy variables for countries to control for all country-
specific variables (column 2). The third one adds the control variables (Creditor Rights, 
Rule of Law, Bank Costs) as explanatory variables in the estimation (column 3). 
The fourth and fifth estimations (columns 4 and 5) add the country-level variables 
which affect the degree of information asymmetries (Trust, Information Sharing, 
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Accounting Standards, Economic Development, Financial Development). As Accounting 
Standards is only available for 35 countries among the 43 in our sample, we perform the 
estimations with and without this variable. 
The major finding is the positive coefficient of Collateral, which is significant at 
the 1% level in all regressions. This result is robust to all five estimations. We therefore 
observe that risk premium increases when the loan is secured. This broad evidence does 
not support the theoretical argument according to which collateral helps solve the 
problem of adverse selection. It corroborates in contrast the observed-risk hypothesis 
according to which banks would ask for more collateral from riskier companies, which 
are already charged with higher loan rates. We then support most empirical evidence on 
this issue, which concludes a positive link between the presence of collateral and risk 
premium. 
Turning to the loan-level control variables, we can stress the robustness of their 
signs across the five estimations. Maturity is positive in all estimations and significant in 
four of them, suggesting that longer loans are charged with greater risk premium in 
accordance with literature. Number of Lenders has a significant and negative coefficient 
in all estimations, in accordance with the view of a lower risk premium for loans with a 
greater number of lenders. This is an expected result as syndicated loans benefit from 
lower risk premium than other loans (Allen, 1990). 
Loan Type is positive in all estimations, suggesting that term loans are charged with 
greater risk premium. This finding can be explained by the lower risk of term loans than 
of other loans, once maturity is controlled. The coefficient of Loan Size is negative in all 
estimations, even if it is significant only once. This finding supports the view that bigger 
loans are charged with lower risk premium, as shown in the literature. Finally the 
presence of covenants is positively associated with risk premium. 
This subsection has shown that collateral is positively associated with risk premium 
in our cross-country sample. Supporting the observed-risk hypothesis, this is a major 
result, as it is the first study that uses a cross-country sample. The heterogeneity of our 
country sample presents a major advantage which must be exploited for a thorough 
investigation of the role of collateral to solve adverse selection. Indeed, the positive link 
between collateral and risk premium may be dependent on the degree of information 
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asymmetries between the borrower and the bank before the loan is granted. Therefore, the 
adverse selection hypothesis can also receive some support if we observe that greater 
information asymmetries reduce the positive link between collateral and risk premium. In 
this aim, we perform estimations controlling for the influence of the degree of 
information asymmetries. 
 
IV.2 The estimations with an interaction term 
We now turn to estimations including an interaction term between Collateral and 
one country-specific variable which might influence the degree of ex ante information 
asymmetries between the borrower and the bank. To examine the sensitivity of the 
results, we perform the regressions with two different condition information sets of 
country-level variables. The first set of regressors includes the control variables and the 
variable interacting with Collateral, while the second set includes all country-level 
variables. We then aim to reduce the chances that the cross-country regressions include a 
selected group of regressors which yields a favored result. 
The first estimations are devoted to the opacity of financial information. We test the 
role of two variables: Accounting Standards, and Information Sharing. In addition, as 
Information Sharing can be decomposed into its two components, we also investigate the 
role of Public Registry and Private Bureau. The estimations with Accounting Standards 
are displayed in table 3, while those for Information Sharing and its components are 
presented in table 4. We observe that the coefficient of the interaction term is 
significantly positive for the estimations with Accounting Standards and Information 
Sharing. These findings therefore support the view that a lower degree of information 
asymmetries increases the positive relationship between collateral and risk premium, and 
consequently enhances the likelihood of the observed-risk hypothesis. They may also be 
in accordance with the adverse selection hypothesis, as a low degree of one of these 
variables could be small enough to favor a negative relationship between collateral and 
risk premium. 
Therefore, we check whether the relationship might be negative in some countries. 
To this end, we compute the overall coefficient of Collateral for all estimations, which is 
the sum of the coefficients of Collateral and of the interaction term multiplied by the 
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value of the key variable. Indeed the overall coefficient of Collateral may be negative for 
low values of the key value. The thresholds are computed in all cases and compared to 
the values of countries.2 The threshold is 40.966 with Accounting Standards. We have 
three countries with values for this variable below the threshold (Egypt, Peru, Uruguay). 
With Information Sharing, the threshold is 0.271. As this is a dummy variable, countries 
with a zero value are below the threshold. In this case is only India. Therefore, the link 
between collateral and risk premium can be negative in some countries owing to their 
strong degree of information asymmetries.  
A final remark concerns the results for both variables taking the presence of 
information-sharing institutions into account. We can observe that the positive and 
significant sign of Information Sharing is explained by the component Private Bureau, as 
the interaction term is significant in the estimation with Private Bureau and is not in the 
one with Public Registry. This result supports the view that, contrary to the existence of 
public registries, the existence of private bureaus contributes to improve the information 
owned by banks. 
The second estimations concern Trust, and are displayed in Table 3. Our results 
show again a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term. As Trust proxies 
honesty of the borrower and trust of the bank towards the borrower, this finding is again 
in favor of the view that a lower degree of information asymmetries contributes to 
strengthen the positive relationship between collateral and risk premium. With Trust, the 
overall coefficient of Collateral is always positive as both coefficients for Collateral and 
for the interaction term are positive. Therefore, the degree of Trust can not lead to some 
countries in which collateral would affect negatively risk premium. 
Finally, the third set of estimations is devoted to the role of economic and financial 
development and is presented in table 5. As mentioned above, the argument is that bank 
employees would benefit from better skills in analysis of risk default for loans in a 
country with a greater level of economic and financial development. Therefore, they 
would face a lower degree of ex ante information asymmetries. Once again, we observe 
positive and significant coefficients for the interaction term in the regressions. As greater 
                                                          
2 We only compute here the thresholds for estimations with the full conditioning information set (odd-
numbered estimations), but results are totally similar when the thresholds are computed for estimations 
with the simple conditioning information set (even-numbered estimations). 
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economic and financial development is associated with lower information asymmetries, 
these findings support the views that lower information asymmetries increase the positive 
link between collateral and risk premium. 
We can again wonder whether there exist some countries characterized by 
information asymmetries strong enough to lead to a negative link between presence of 
collateral and risk premium. With Economic Development, the threshold is 7.149. 
However the minimum value for this variable is 7.149. As a result, no country has an 
overall coefficient of Collateral which is negative. With Financial Development, the 
threshold is 0.295. Thirteen countries have a value below this threshold (Argentina, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Slovenia, Turkey, 
Uruguay, Venezuela), which mean that the overall coefficient of collateral is negative for 
these countries. 
In summary, the findings clearly support the hypothesis that the degree of 
information asymmetries exerts an influence on the relationship between collateral and 
risk premium. We therefore provide some support for the observed-risk hypothesis and 
the adverse selection hypothesis, as both hypotheses may be empirically validated 
depending on the degree of information asymmetries in the country. In accordance with 
this remark, we observe that the relationship between presence of collateral and risk 
premium, which was positive in benchmark regressions, can be negative in countries with 
strong information asymmetries. Such finding is only observed for developing countries, 
which may explain why this result contradicts former evidence on this topic. It also 
constitutes a major motivation ex post for this seminal investigation on a sample of 
countries, including some developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
IV.3 Robustness tests 
Our robustness checks include two sets of tests. The first one investigates the 
inclusion of alternative country-level variables. The second one analyzes the issue of 
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endogeneity of collateral in our estimations. In all robustness tests, we display results 
from model specifications with the full conditioning information set. 
We first test the inclusion of alternative country-level variables. We start by adding 
“fundamental variables” in the estimations. Namely, such variables affect institutional 
variables which were adopted in our estimations. We test the presence of two sets of 
fundamental characteristics. We add variables for legal origin, as this dimension has been 
shown to influence financial development (La Porta et al., 1997a). We add dummy 
variables if legal origin is Common law, French origin, German origin, or Socialist 
origin. The dummy variable for Scandinavian origin is dropped. As legal origin exerts an 
impact on creditor rights and rule of law, we exclude these latter variables from the 
regressions that take legal origin into account. Furthermore, we control for culture, which 
can be defined as “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social 
groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation.” (Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales, 2006). Following Stulz and Williamson (2003), we proxy culture by religion 
and define primary religion as the one practiced by the largest fraction of the country. We 
add dummy variables if the primary religion is Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or Buddhist. 
The dummy variable if another religion is the most practiced is dropped.3 
Additionally, we test the presence of alternative variables for legal environment to 
check the sensitivity of our findings to the choice of legal environment variables. We add 
legal formalism, which measures costs of enforcing contracts through courts, based on 
surveys of lawyers and judges, and which is provided by Djankov et al. (2003). This 
variable is strongly correlated with Rule of Law. Therefore, this latter variable is excluded 
from the estimation including Legal Formalism. 
We also account for corruption. Indeed corruption may influence the behavior of 
the banks, as more corruption may increase banks’ safeguards against loan loss, owing to 
unpredictable court decisions or loans granted by bribed employees. Corruption is 
measured with the World Bank’s index “Corruption” (Corruption) (Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999a,b). This composite index aggregates indicators of corruption 
                                                          
3 Religion could have been interacted with collateral to check whether religion exerts an influence on the 
link between collateral and risk premium. However such investigation is useless owing to the difficulties of 
the interpretation in terms of information asymmetries. There are indeed no straightforward expectations to 
which the different religions should be associated to the degree of information asymmetries. 
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obtained from experts’ surveys and indices of corruption resting on residents’ surveys. It 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 with greater values for less corrupted countries. For clarity, we 
rescaled the index from 0 for the lowest corruption to 10 for the highest corruption. 
The estimations with all these alternative sets of variables are presented in table 6, 
in which we display coefficients for Collateral and for the interaction term between 
Collateral and the country-level variables proxying the degree of information 
asymmetries. Most of our findings are robust to the specification of the set of country-
level variables. This specification for all variables does not affect the sign and the 
significance of the interaction term, with certain exceptions for the significance of the 
interaction term with Trust. For this latter variable, the interaction term is significant in 
estimations with Corruption and Legal Formalism, as it was in standard estimations. 
However the introduction of “fundamental” country-level variables cancels the 
significance of the interaction term. Such results can be explained by the influence of 
“fundamental” variables on trust, notably by the potential impact of religion on trust. 
This first set of tests leads to the conclusion that our findings are robust to the 
choice of country-level variables, as alternative specifications do not alter our results. 
We now turn to the issues of endogeneity in our estimations. Following previous 
studies (Berger and Udell, 1990; Harhoff and Körting, 1998), we have assumed that 
collateral and risk premium are determined in a sequential procedure, with the collateral 
decision preceding the determination of risk premium. This assumption of sequentiality is 
widely accepted in empirical works (Dennis, Nandy and Sharpe, 2000; Dennis and 
Sharpe, 2005; Bharath et al., 2006). However, such an approach ignores the potential 
endogeneity issue of collateral with risk premium, as well as the potential simultaneity 
between these both loan characteristics. 
In order to tackle these issues, we re-estimate the model specifications using a 
simultaneous equations framework4. Under the hypothesis of sequentiality in the 
collateral and risk premium decision, we assume a unidirectional relationship between 
                                                          
4 Let’s also note that we cannot clearly reject the hypothesis of endogeneity of the Collateral variable in the 
Risk Premium equation (4) at the 1% level using Durban-Wu-Hausman test. 
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Risk Premium and Collateral, following Dennis, Nandy and Sharpe (2000) and Bharath 
et al.(2006). The two equations structural model can be described as follows5 
 
* *Risk Premium (Intercept,Collateral ,Collateral Key Variable, , )
Collateral (Intercept, , )
f X
g Z
ε
υ
⎧  = ×⎨ =⎩
 (2) 
 
*Collateral is the fitted value of Collateral estimated in a first stage and 
*Collateral ×Key Variable  is the crossed variable using the fitted value of Collateral and 
the investigated Key Variable. X is a vector of the explanatory variables used in the 
individual regressions already described. Z  is a vector of the following explanatory 
variables : Loan Type, Loan Amount, Number of Lenders, Distribution Method, Seniority, 
and dummy variables for industries and years. ε  and υ  are the residuals which are 
supposed to be normally distributed. Distribution Method is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the loan is syndicated (82.94% of our sample) and Seniority is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the loan is senior (45.30% of our sample). 
We use the three stages least squares (3SLS) method to estimate the two equations 
model in order to exploit the correlation of the disturbances across the equations6. The 
estimation of the system is complicated by the presence of both continuous (Risk 
Premium) and discrete choice (Collateral) variables. We follow Angrist (2001) and 
estimate the equation explaining Collateral with a probit regression in a first stage. The 
instruments for the 3SLS estimates are obtained from the benchmark and with interaction 
terms regressions and the specification for Collateral. The explanatory variables for the 
former have been selected following statistical analysis: we have retained the variables 
which are the most correlated with Collateral and the least correlated with Risk Premium. 
The results of stepwise discriminant analysis and probit regression confirm this selection. 
Results from the probit regression of Collateral are displayed in table 7. The 
statistics of the regression are satisfactory, with a significant likelihood ratio and a 
                                                          
5 We present the general specification, although we first estimate the equations system for the benchmark 
regressions and then for the interaction terms. 
6 Two stage least squares (2SLS) method gives similar regressions results. 
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satisfactory percentage of concordance (above 75%). All of the coefficients have 
expected significant signs. 
We display the results from model specifications with the full conditioning 
information set in tables 8 and 9. Table 8 gives the results of the re-estimation of the 
specification for the two benchmark regressions in columns 4 and 5 from table 2. The 
main finding is the switch of sign for the coefficient of Collateral, which becomes 
significantly negative. This is in sharp contrast with former studies on the link between 
collateral and risk premium (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1990). However all former studies did 
not control for endogeneity of collateral. 
On a theoretical basis, this result is consistent with the adverse selection hypothesis, 
according to which collateral serves as a signalling instrument (Bester, 1985; Chan and 
Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987).  
In addition, this view is supported by Bharath et al. (2006). These authors 
investigate the benefits of relationship banking for companies. To this end, they analyze 
the determinants of loan price on a sample of US loans, including the presence of 
collateral. They therefore obtain similar findings to ours. On the one hand, the OLS 
regressions show a positive and significant sign for the presence of collateral as an 
explaining variable of the loan price. On the other hand, the estimations performed with a 
simultaneous equations model controlling for endogeneity change this result to a negative 
and significant coefficient for the presence of collateral. 
This is a major finding, as it suggests that, when endogeneity is controlled, a 
negative link emerges between collateral and risk premium. However, our key issue is 
not the sign of this relationship for the full sample, but whether the degree of ex ante 
information asymmetries influences this link. This is a more relevant issue to understand 
the use of collateral by banks, since it tends to demonstrate that adverse selection and 
observed-risk hypotheses may not be antagonistic, and can both be empirically validated 
depending of the degree of the country. 
To this end, we perform estimations with interaction terms between Collateral and 
the country-specific variables proxying the degree of ex ante information asymmetries for 
the regressions from tables 3, 4, 5, 6. We are able to test whether the observed signs of 
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the interaction terms remain unchanged when endogeneity is controlled. These 
estimations are reported in table 9. 
All coefficients of the interaction terms remain positive, but some are not 
significant. More specifically, the estimations with Trust, Economic Development and 
Financial Development show positive and significant coefficients for the interaction 
term, while the coefficients for the interaction term with Accounting Standards and 
Information Sharing are not significant, even if their sign does not switch. 
Consequently, we conclude that the tests controlling for endogeneity do not hamper 
our key finding regarding the role of information asymmetries on the relationship 
between collateral and risk premium. Indeed, we still observe that lower information 
asymmetries increase the overall coefficient of Collateral to explain Risk Premium. 
Therefore, these robustness tests strengthen our main conclusion that both observed-risk 
and adverse selection hypotheses may be empirically validated depending of the degree 
of information asymmetries in the country. 
 
V. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we analyze the role of collateral to mitigate adverse selection 
problems on a large set of loans from 43 countries. According to the adverse selection 
hypothesis, we should observe a negative relationship between the presence of collateral 
and risk premium, as collateral constitutes a signalling instrument for high-quality 
borrowers. The observed-risk hypothesis is however in favor of a positive link between 
these both variables, owing to the ability of the bank to sort borrowers according to their 
quality. 
At first glance, these hypotheses are contradictory, even though they are both based 
on the degree of information asymmetries before the loan granting. Indeed, the adverse 
selection hypothesis assumes the existence of strong information asymmetries resulting in 
the need for the borrower to use quality signals, while observed-risk hypothesis considers 
low information asymmetries leading to the ability of the bank to observe borrower risk. 
As a consequence, both hypotheses may be empirically validated depending on the 
degree of information asymmetries. 
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We find that a lower degree of information asymmetries, proxied through five 
country-level variables, enhances the positive relationship between the presence of 
collateral and risk premium. We therefore provide some support for the adverse selection 
and observed-risk hypotheses, as both hypotheses may be empirically validated 
depending on the degree of information asymmetries in the country. In addition, this 
result is robust to tests controlling for the potential endogeneity of collateral. 
Our findings strongly qualify the view that the role of collateral to mitigate adverse 
selection problems should be rejected, in sharp contrast to the existing empirical 
literature. They are in line with the theoretical arguments provided notably by Bester 
(1985), Chan and Kanatas (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987). 
The normative implications of our findings are the support of the efforts to reduce 
information asymmetries before the loan granting. Indeed, collateral requirements have 
been widely mentioned to constitute major obstacles to the access to credit. Therefore, as 
lower information asymmetries reduce such requirements, they favor access to credit and 
consequently promote investment. Authorities can contribute to reduce information 
asymmetries through better quality of financial information and the implementation of 
information-sharing institutions. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics on key variables by country 
 
 
This table provides means for Risk Premium (in basic points), Maturity (in months), Number of Lenders, Loan Size (in 
thousand dollars), and frequencies for Collateral, Loan Type, Covenants. N is the number of loans. 
 
Country N Risk 
Premium 
Collateral Maturity Number of 
Lenders 
Loan 
Type 
Loan 
Size 
Covenants 
Argentina 47 250.03 0.6808 60.79 9.66 0.7660 97,953.2 0.2979 
Australia 772 114.88 0.4003 84.78 7.35 0.3873 111,551.8 0.2176 
Austria 8 230.00 0.8750 77.88 8.88 0.6250 80,197.3 0.1250 
Belgium 16 156.56 0.9375 64.88 13.19 0.5000 193,347.6 0.1250 
Brazil 50 263.93 0.8200 48.72 7.92 0.8000 118,449.8 0.1600 
Chile 31 204.03 0.6774 55.19 9.39 0.7742 112,673.0 0.4194 
China 405 135.89 0.4765 70.36 6.79 0.6988 34,622.0 0.1358 
Colombia 11 273.86 0.6364 56.73 6.00 0.8182 62,457.7 0.5455 
Denmark 16 191.09 0.8125 74.25 12.19 0.4375 547,022.2 0.1250 
Egypt 10 169.25 0.9000 84.40 10.40 0.7000 207,366.8 0.4000 
Finland 16 164.69 0.6875 76.00 12.31 0.5625 171,483.9 0.3750 
France 285 228.77 0.8877 78.23 8.19 0.5333 71,128.6 0.1860 
Ghana 6 71.67 1.0000 15.17 20.00 1.0000 359,419.2 0.1667 
Greece 37 221.88 0.8919 86.65 5.05 0.4324 88,631.7 0.2162 
Guatemala 2 200.00 1.0000 72.00 9.50 1.0000 54,843.8 0.0000 
Hungary 13 140.38 0.7692 74.46 8.46 0.4615 100,936.3 0.0769 
India 202 158.30 0.4554 69.69 5.77 0.7723 35,321.4 0.0891 
Indonesia 665 254.39 0.6782 55.43 8.77 0.5699 32,605.8 0.0361 
Ireland 42 214.70 0.7143 91.00 10.24 0.5000 191,423.7 0.5476 
Israel 8 99.06 0.7500 56.25 4.00 0.5000 60,008.7 0.3750 
Italy 94 190.80 0.9043 75.78 9.44 0.5745 141,810.2 0.1702 
Japan 273 92.65 0.1099 41.91 7.75 0.4103 95,058.2 0.1795 
Korea 921 117.19 0.3605 64.51 6.65 0.5548 39,036.2 0.0988 
Mexico 91 229.75 0.6264 54.14 9.77 0.7473 102,975.3 0.3736 
Morocco 1 110.00 1.0000 12.00 16.00 0.0000 335,120.3 0.0000 
Netherlands 154 189.33 0.7857 71.74 8.90 0.4481 118,449.8 0.3312 
New Zeal. 122 115.54 0.2131 64.51 4.93 0.2704 74,775.4 0.2295 
Norway 45 202.67 0.8222 71.44 5.58 0.3556 101,950.7 0.3556 
Pakistan 43 277.94 0.3953 40.51 5.84 0.8372 35,321.4 0.0233 
Peru 9 198.61 1.0000 85.33 13.67 0.4444 119,640.3 0.2222 
Philippines 232 247.68 0.5216 73.03 6.74 0.5991 36,035.0 0.1207 
Poland 23 124.88 0.8261 70.04 9.48 0.3043 95,058.2 0.3479 
Portugal 12 120.21 0.9167 137.00 13.17 0.4167 243,347.3 0.1667 
Singapore 256 145.76 0.5742 59.14 6.05 0.4219 48,158.1 0.2656 
Slovenia 4 95.63 0.7500 93.00 12.00 0.5000 44,902.3 0.0000 
South Africa 9 320.00 0.8889 57.33 8.00 0.1111 76,286.0 0.6667 
Spain 269 136.04 0.7658 90.03 11.64 0.6468 66,986.4 0.1115 
Sweden 42 84.30 0.5238 61.95 8.57 0.3095 243,347.3 0.3571 
Switzerland 40 228.19 0.7500 60.70 10.63 0.3500 127,038.4 0.4750 
Turkey 18 191.11 0.8333 75.83 11.39 0.5000 129,604.8 0.2222 
UK 528 185.90 0.7670 71.40 10.45 0.4564 146,128.9 0.3693 
Uruguay 3 91.67 1.0000 42.00 1.00 0.6667 9,065.6 0.0000 
Venezuela 12 146.46 0.8333 68.58 10.25 0.8333 68,339.6 0.0000 
Full sample 5843 166.06 0.5572 68.71 7.98 0.5300 65,006.6 0.1836 
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Table 2 
Benchmark regressions 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Risk Premium. Table reports 
coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at 
the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and years are included in the regressions but are 
not reported. 
 
 Estimations 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Intercept 278.584*** 
(8.77) 
328.178*** 
(8.40) 
235.246*** 
(7.57) 
202.162*** 
(2.81) 
671.700*** 
(6.93) 
Collateral 62.625*** 
(13.48) 
32.896*** 
(6.92) 
43.291*** 
(9.40) 
43.542*** 
(9.43) 
47.794*** 
(9.95) 
Maturity 0.061 
(1.48) 
0.178*** 
(4.48) 
0.141*** 
(3.54) 
0.142*** 
(3.57) 
0.087** 
(2.24) 
Number of lenders -22.108*** 
(9.39) 
-22.431*** 
(9.77) 
-24.567*** 
(10.76) 
-24.828*** 
(10.85) 
-20.985*** 
(8.79) 
Loan Type 13.090*** 
(3.06) 
6.834 
(1.63) 
2.537 
(0.61) 
2.877 
(0.69) 
15.167*** 
(3.55) 
Loan Size -4.345** 
(2.52) 
-1.436 
(0.82) 
-0.751 
(0.44) 
-0.124 
(0.07) 
-1.810 
(1.03) 
Covenants 13.650** 
(2.23) 
8.088 
(1.33) 
19.359*** 
(3.25) 
20.295*** 
(3.38) 
23.361*** 
(4.07) 
Economic Development - - - 1.116 
(0.13) 
-71.508*** 
(6.58) 
Financial Development - - - 2.135 
(0.27) 
10.344 
(1.30) 
Information Sharing - - - 31.027** 
(2.10) 
74.556*** 
(4.37) 
Trust - - - -0.394** 
(2.18) 
-0.290 
(1.25) 
Accounting Standards - - - - 
 
1.953*** 
(3.81) 
Creditor Rights - - 1.853 
(0.77) 
4.532* 
(1.76) 
-4.569* 
(1.65) 
Rule of Law - - -43.250*** 
(12.97) 
-49.570*** 
(5.85) 
14.007 
(1.16) 
Banking Costs - - 1045.883 
*** 
(5.65) 
865.286*** 
(4.09) 
1059.293 
*** 
(5.08) 
Country dummy variables No Yes No No No 
Adjusted R² 0.0910 0.1793 0.1520 0.1530 0.1741 
N 5843 5843 5843 5843 4724 
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Table 3 
Regressions with interaction variables for trust and accounting standards 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Risk Premium. Table reports 
coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at 
the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and years are included in the regressions but are 
not reported. 
 
 Key variable 
Explanatory variables Trust Accounting Standards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 257.672*** 
(7.95) 
217.578*** 
(3.00) 
200.414*** 
(3.85) 
750.576*** 
(7.30) 
Collateral 21.046 
(1.63) 
21.232* 
(1.65) 
-58.475 
(1.27) 
-61.326 
(1.28) 
Collateral×KeyVariable 0.585* 
(1.87) 
0.578* 
(1.85) 
1.452** 
(2.31) 
1.497** 
(2.29) 
Maturity 0.140*** 
(3.52) 
0.143*** 
(3.59) 
0.079** 
(2.05) 
0.087** 
(2.25) 
Number of Lenders -24.478*** 
(10.72) 
-24.782*** 
(10.83) 
-21.816*** 
(9.12) 
-20.939*** 
(8.77) 
Loan Type 2.060 
(0.49) 
2.811 
(0.67) 
14.268*** 
(3.30) 
14.129*** 
(3.29) 
Loan Size -0.389 
(0.22) 
-0.182 
(0.10) 
-2.266 
(1.30) 
-1.622 
(0.93) 
Covenants 20.190*** 
(3.38) 
20.394*** 
(3.40) 
26.453*** 
(4.61) 
23.642*** 
(4.12) 
Economic Development - 1.103 
(0.13) 
- -71.889*** 
(6.62) 
Financial Development - 2.313 
(0.29) 
- 5.040 
(0.61) 
Information Sharing - 30.737** 
(2.08) 
- 80.213*** 
(4.65) 
Trust -0.637** 
(2.52) 
-0.739*** 
(2.85) 
- -0.263 
(1.13) 
Accounting Standards - - 0.785 
(1.22) 
0.769 
(1.06) 
Creditor Rights 2.383 
(0.95) 
3.954 
(1.52) 
-0.235 
(0.10) 
-4.756* 
(1.72) 
Rule of Law -45.066*** 
(12.61) 
-49.252*** 
(5.81) 
-44.480*** 
(6.84) 
18.104 
(1.48) 
Bank Costs 955.301*** 
(4.92) 
874.504*** 
(4.13) 
921.210*** 
(4.64) 
1082.382*** 
(5.18) 
Adjusted R² 0.1526 0.1533 0.1652 0.1749 
N 5843 5843 4724 4724 
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Table 4 
Regressions with interaction variables for information sharing and its components 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Risk Premium. Table reports 
coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at 
the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and years are included in the regressions but are 
not reported. 
 
Key variable Explanatory 
variables Information Sharing Public Registry Private Bureau 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 235.284*** 
(6.80) 
230.672*** 
(3.18) 
242.284*** 
(7.63) 
139.538** 
(2.06) 
241.677*** 
(7.71) 
115.515* 
(1.70) 
Collateral -17.393 
(0.80) 
-17.112 
(0.79) 
43.227*** 
(7.91) 
44.689*** 
(8.13) 
32.590*** 
(3.91) 
27.407*** 
(3.22) 
Collateral×KeyVa
riable 
62.800*** 
(2.85) 
63.030*** 
(2.86) 
2.088 
(0.23) 
-1.825 
(0.20) 
14.354 
(1.51) 
21.220** 
(2.17) 
Maturity 0.142*** 
(3.57) 
0.141*** 
(3.54) 
0.141*** 
(3.55) 
0.142*** 
(3.55) 
0.136*** 
(3.41) 
0.136*** 
(3.41) 
Number 
of Lenders 
-24.669*** 
(10.80) 
-24.681*** 
(10.79) 
-24.358*** 
(10.62) 
-24.643*** 
(10.73) 
-24.445*** 
(10.70) 
-24.732*** 
(10.81) 
Loan Type 3.437 
(0.82) 
3.025 
(0.72) 
2.440 
(0.58) 
2.731 
(0.65) 
2.501 
(0.60) 
2.931 
(0.70) 
Loan Size -0.790 
(0.46) 
-0.197 
(0.11) 
-0.719 
(0.42) 
-0.183 
(0.10) 
-0.736 
(0.43) 
0.025 
(0.01) 
Covenants 19.403*** 
(3.26) 
20.433*** 
(3.41) 
19.054*** 
(3.19) 
20.585*** 
(3.43) 
18.938*** 
(3.18) 
20.835*** 
(3.48) 
Economic 
Development 
- 
 
1.114 
(0.13) 
- 12.094* 
(1.66) 
- 15.682** 
(2.14) 
Financial 
Development 
- 
 
2.572 
(0.33) 
- 5.788 
(0.76) 
- 8.715 
(1.15) 
Information 
Sharing 
-0.136 
(0.01) 
2.082 
(0.12) 
- - - - 
Public Registry - - -7.881 
(0.92) 
-4.687 
(0.52) 
- - 
Private Bureau - - - - -12.681 
(1.41) 
-26.086*** 
(2.64) 
Trust - 
 
-0.397** 
(2.20) 
- -0.353* 
(1.88) 
- -0.556*** 
(2.85) 
Accounting 
Standards 
- - 
 
- - - - 
Creditor Rights 2.916 
(1.20) 
4.603* 
(1.78) 
1.043 
(0.41) 
3.297 
(1.20) 
-12.681 
(1.41) 
5.254** 
(1.96) 
Rule of Law -45.199*** 
(13.24) 
-49.764*** 
(5.87) 
-45.245*** 
(11.86) 
-59.949*** 
(7.35) 
1.630 
(0.67) 
-58.193*** 
(7.52) 
Bank Costs 980.003 
***(5.27) 
848.496 
***(4.01) 
1019.943 
***(5.46) 
840.984 
***(3.93) 
1078.116 
***(5.48) 
904.264 
***(4.18) 
Adjusted R² 0.1537 0.1540 0.1518 0.1523 0.1520 0.1532 
N 5843 5843 5843 5843 5843 5843 
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Table 5 
Regressions with interaction variables for economic and financial development 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Risk Premium. Table reports 
coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at 
the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and years are included in the regressions but are 
not reported. 
 
 Key variable 
Explanatory variables Economic development Financial development 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 224.571*** 
(3.27) 
279.223*** 
(3.74) 
256.508*** 
(8.04) 
188.765*** 
(2.63) 
Collateral -132.709*** 
(2.78) 
-140.687*** 
(2.94) 
-23.106** 
(2.20) 
-23.967** 
(2.28) 
Collateral×KeyVariable 18.774*** 
(3.70) 
19.679*** 
(3.87) 
79.953*** 
(7.06) 
81.154*** 
(7.14) 
Maturity 0.134*** 
(3.37) 
0.135*** 
(3.39) 
0.137*** 
(3.43) 
0.135*** 
(3.41) 
Number of Lenders -24.415*** 
(10.67) 
-24.257*** 
(10.69) 
-24.054*** 
(10.56) 
-24.327*** 
(10.67) 
Loan Type 2.496 
(0.60) 
2.223 
(0.53) 
2.773 
(0.67) 
3.174 
(0.76) 
Loan Size -0.405 
(0.24) 
0.263 
(0.15) 
-0.741 
(0.43) 
-0.064 
(0.04) 
Covenants 19.878*** 
(3.33) 
20.127*** 
(3.36) 
17.506*** 
(2.95) 
18.998*** 
(3.18) 
Economic Development 0.861 
(0.12) 
-8.579 
(0.98) 
- 6.492 
(0.77) 
Financial Development - 3.114 
(0.40) 
-28.233*** 
(3.32) 
-31.038*** 
(3.41) 
Information Sharing - 33.714** 
(2.28) 
- 25.115* 
(1.71) 
Trust - -0.410** 
(2.27) 
- -0.441** 
(2.45) 
Accounting Standards - - 
 
- - 
Creditor Rights 3.115 
(1.27) 
5.193** 
(2.01) 
-0.661 
(0.27) 
2.373 
(0.92) 
Rule of Law -54.330*** 
(7.55) 
-51.744*** 
(6.10) 
-45.251*** 
(12.58) 
-55.732*** 
(6.57) 
Bank Costs 963.619*** 
(4.98) 
864.314*** 
(4.09) 
1183.824*** 
(6.20) 
924.120*** 
(4.38) 
Adjusted R² 0.1539 0.1550 0.1590 0.1602 
N 5843 5843 5843 5843 
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Table 6 
Robustness tests with alternative country-level variables 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Risk Premium. Table reports 
coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at 
the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and years are included in the regressions but are 
not reported. All estimations are performed with the full conditioning set of country-level variables 
(Economic Development, Financial Development, Information Sharing, Trust, Accounting Standards, 
Creditor Rights, Rule of Law, Bank Costs) except where indicated. Standard estimations are a reminder of 
the results displayed in tables 2, 3 and 4. Estimations with legal origin add dummy variables whether the 
legal origin is Common Law, French origin, German origin, or Socialist origin (dummy variable for 
Scandinavian origin is dropped) to the full conditioning set of variables, and exclude the variables Creditor 
Rights and Rule of Law. Estimations with religion variables add dummy variables whether the religion 
practiced by the largest fraction of the population is Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or Buddhist religion 
(dummy variable for other religion is dropped) to the full conditioning information set of variables. 
Estimations with Legal Formalism replace Rule of Law by this variable in the full conditioning information 
set of variables. Estimations with Corruption replace Rule of Law by this variable in the full conditioning 
set of variables. 
 
 Key variable 
Explanatory variables Economic 
Develop. 
Financial 
Develop. 
Trust Information 
Sharing 
Accounting 
Standards 
Standard estimations      
Collateral -140.687*** 
(2.94) 
-23.967** 
(2.28) 
21.232* 
(1.65) 
-17.112 
(0.79) 
-61.326 
(1.28) 
Collateral×Key Variable 19.679*** 
(3.87) 
81.154*** 
(7.14) 
0.578* 
(1.85) 
63.030*** 
(2.86) 
1.497** 
(2.29) 
Adjusted R² 0.1550 0.1602 0.1533 0.1540 0.1749 
With Legal Origin      
Collateral -147.819*** 
(3.09) 
-11.326 
(1.08) 
36.638*** 
(2.83) 
-66.231 
(1.37) 
-17.616 
(0.81) 
Collateral×Key Variable 20.211*** 
(3.96) 
63.758*** 
(5.58) 
0.115 
(0.36) 
1.556** 
(2.36) 
61.044*** 
(2.78) 
Adjusted R² 0.1635 0.1657 0.1613 0.1745 0.1624 
With Religion      
Collateral -162.269*** 
(3.38) 
-24.193** 
(2.26) 
24.097* 
(1.86) 
-18.717 
(0.87) 
-67.368 
(1.39) 
Collateral×Key Variable 21.655*** 
(4.24) 
77.866*** 
(6.68) 
0.419 
(1.33) 
61.368*** 
(2.80) 
1.578** 
(2.38) 
Adjusted R² 0.1648 0.1686 0.1625 0.1634 0.1747 
With Legal Formalism      
Collateral -126.648*** 
(2.64) 
-16.344 
(1.56) 
19.049 
(1.45) 
-15.506 
(0.71) 
-67.641 
(1.42) 
Collateral×Key Variable 18.297*** 
(3.59) 
73.322*** 
(6.46) 
0.662** 
(2.11) 
62.438*** 
(2.82) 
1.597** 
(2.45) 
Adjusted R² 0.1500 0.1542 0.1488 0.1493 0.1755 
With Corruption      
Collateral -123.621*** 
(2.57) 
-20.242* 
(1.90) 
20.818 
(1.61) 
-15.365 
(0.71) 
-67.104 
(1.39) 
Collateral×Key Variable 17.978*** 
(3.52) 
78.691*** 
(6.75) 
0.614** 
(1.96) 
62.271*** 
(2.81) 
1.566** 
(2.37) 
Adjusted R² 0.1497 0.1545 0.1484 0.1490 0.1749 
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Table 7 
Probit estimation of the Collateral equation for 3SLS regressions 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Collateral. Table reports 
coefficients with Wald Chi-Squares in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different 
from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and years are included in the 
regressions but are not reported. 
 
 Estimation 
Explanatory variables  
Intercept 3.657*** 
(160.46) 
Loan Type 0.168*** 
(20.04) 
Loan Amount -0.168*** 
(124.59) 
Number of Lenders 0.123*** 
(33.51) 
Distribution Method 0.365*** 
(46.97) 
Seniority 0.693*** 
(179.76) 
LR 1290.33*** 
Percent Concordant 75.1 
N 5843 
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Table 8 
3SLS estimation for benchmark regressions 
 
Collateral* is the fitted value of Collateral, estimated with a probit model. Instruments for the 3SLS 
regression are taken from equations (2). Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent 
variables in the equations system are Risk Premium and Collateral. Results for the Risk Premium 
estimation are provided. Table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and 
years are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
 Estimations 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) 
   
Intercept 416.61*** 
(5.06) 
812.125*** 
(7.84) 
Collateral* -79.33*** 
(3.45) 
-36.506* 
(1.65) 
Maturity 0.124*** 
(3.17) 
0.072* 
(1.91) 
Number of lenders -17.43*** 
(6.54) 
-16.308*** 
(5.92) 
Loan Type 13.51*** 
(2.90) 
22.431*** 
(4.78) 
Loan Size -7.02*** 
(3.25) 
-6.458*** 
(3.04) 
Covenants 28.409*** 
(4.62) 
29.251*** 
(4.97) 
Economic Development 0.268 
(0.03) 
-70.124*** 
(6.47) 
Financial Development 4.607 
(0.59) 
10.883 
(4.25) 
Information Sharing 26.223* 
(1.78) 
72.437*** 
(4.25) 
Trust -0.208 
(1.13) 
-0.104 
(0.44) 
Accounting Standards - 
 
1.756*** 
(3.42) 
Creditor Rights 2.365 
(0.91) 
-5.887** 
(2.12) 
Rule of Law -42.507*** 
(4.97) 
17.683 
(1.46) 
Banking Costs 1308.324*** 
(5.80) 
1378.086*** 
(6.23) 
Country dummy variables No No 
Adjusted R² 0.1417 0.1571 
N 5843 4724 
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Table 9 
3SLS estimation for regressions with interaction variables for trust and accounting 
standards 
 
Collateral* is the fitted value of Collateral, estimated with a probit model. Instruments for the 3SLS are 
taken from equations (2). Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variables in the 
equations system are Risk Premium and Collateral. Results for the Risk Premium estimation are provided. 
Table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly 
different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and years are included in the 
regressions but are not reported. 
 
 Key variable 
Explanatory 
variables 
Trust Accounting 
Standards 
Information 
Sharing 
Economic 
development 
Financial 
development 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 423.433*** 
(5.15) 
815.189*** 
(6.56) 
426.943*** 
(4.89) 
879.141*** 
(8.03) 
462.1*** 
(5.63) 
Collateral* -164.935*** 
(4.46) 
-41.43 
(0.37) 
-100.992 
(1.55) 
-952.255*** 
(6.87) 
-250.339*** 
(7.65) 
Collateral* ×  
KeyVariable 
2.359*** 
(2.95) 
0.067 
(0.04) 
22.227 
(0.36) 
90.703*** 
(6.38) 
190.41*** 
(7.3) 
Maturity 0.124*** 
(3.19) 
0.072* 
(1.92) 
0.124*** 
(3.17) 
0.122*** 
(3.13) 
0.103*** 
(2.65) 
Number of Lenders -17.546*** 
(6.59) 
-16.303*** 
(5.91) 
-17.401*** 
(6.53) 
-15.909*** 
(5.97) 
-16.047*** 
(6.04) 
Loan Type 13.184*** 
(2.83) 
22.434*** 
(4.77) 
13.514*** 
(2.9) 
15.724*** 
(3.38) 
14. 148*** 
(3.05) 
Loan Size -6.84*** 
(3.17) 
-6.459*** 
(3.04) 
-7.048*** 
(3.26) 
-7.453*** 
(3.46) 
-6.836*** 
(3.18) 
Covenants 28.356*** 
(4.61) 
29.256*** 
(4.97) 
28.454*** 
(4.63) 
30.526*** 
(4.97) 
28.962*** 
(4.73) 
Economic 
Development 
5.21 
(0.61) 
-70.097*** 
(6.45) 
0.301 
(0.04) 
-49.023*** 
(4.31) 
6.564 
(0.78) 
Financial 
Development 
3.833 
(0.49) 
10.736 
(1.26) 
4.649 
(0.59) 
2.614 
(0.33) 
-102.154*** 
(6.17) 
Information Sharing 22.531 
(1.52) 
72.577*** 
(4.19) 
15.754 
(0.48) 
35.768** 
(2.42) 
27.721* 
(1.89) 
Trust -1.516*** 
(3.16) 
-0.103 
(0.44) 
-0.208 
(1.14) 
-0.269 
(1.47) 
-0.299 
(1.63) 
Accounting 
Standards 
- 1.709 
(1.45) 
- - 
 
- 
 
Creditor Rights 1.568 
(0.6) 
-5.892** 
(2.12) 
2.394 
(0.92) 
2.79 
(1.07) 
-0.618 
(0.24) 
Rule of Law -47.559*** 
(5.46) 
17.781 
(1.45) 
-42.585*** 
(4.98) 
-39.465*** 
(4.62) 
-46.033*** 
(5.4) 
Bank Costs 1289.829*** 
(5.72) 
1378.186*** 
(6.23) 
1306.092*** 
(5.78) 
1322.207*** 
(5.88) 
1247.902*** 
(5.55) 
Adjusted R² 0.143 0.157 0.1415 0.148 0.1501 
N 5843 4724 5843 5843 5843 
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Appendix: Brief description of all variables and their sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
Loan contract characteristics  
Risk Premium Risk premium in basic points Dealscan 
Collateral =1 if the loan is secured by a collateral Dealscan 
Loan Size Logarithm of the size of the loan in thousand 
dollars 
Dealscan 
Maturity Maturity of the loan in months Dealscan 
Loan Type =1 if the loan is a term loan Dealscan 
Number of Lenders Logarithm of the number of lenders Dealscan 
Distribution Method = 1 if the loan is syndicated Dealscan 
Seniority = 1 if the debitor is senior Dealscan 
Country characteristics  
Trust Weighted average normalized to scale 0 to 100 of 
survey responses to question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people ?” (0=can’t be too careful, 1=most 
people can be trusted). 
World Values Survey 
Information Sharing =1 if either a public registry or a private bureau 
operates in the country. or a private registry 
Japelli and Pagano 
(2002) 
Accounting Standards Index created by examining and rating 
companies’1995 annual reports on their inclusion 
or omission of 90 items. 
CIFAR (Center for 
International Financial 
Analysis and Research) 
Economic 
Development 
Mean logarithm of GDP per capita in PPP for the 
period 1992-2000. 
World Penn Tables 6.2 
Financial Development Mean ratio of the volume of credit to private 
companies to GDP for the period 1995-1997. 
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Levine (2000). 
Creditor rights An index aggregating four aspects of creditor 
rights. The index ranges from zero (weak creditor 
rights) to four (strong creditor rights). 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Rule of Law This indicator refers to “the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society”. 
Kaufmann et 
al. (1999a, b) 
Bank costs Total bank overhead costs as a share of total bank 
assets in 1999. 
Barth, Caprio and 
Levine (2004) 
Legal Origin Four dummy variables that identify legal origin, 
for Common, French, German, Socialist legal 
origin. 
La Porta et al. (1997a) 
Religion Four dummy variables depending on the primary 
religion (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Buddhist). 
Stulz and Williamson 
(2003), CIA Factbook 
(2003). 
Legal Formalism A measure of costs of enforcing contracts through 
courts, based on surveys of lawyers and judges. 
Djankov et al. (2003) 
Corruption A composite index of corruption which 
aggregates indicators of corruption obtained from 
experts surveys and some resting on residents 
surveys. The index is rescaled from zero (low 
corruption) to ten (high corruption). 
Kauffmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton (1999a, 
b) 
 
